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MILITARY COMMISSIONS AND THE PARADIGM OF PREVENTION 
 
By David Cole 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Why military commissions? That is the central question posed by President 
George W. Bush’s decision to create the commissions in the first place, by Congress’s 
decision to authorize them twice in statutes enacted in 2006 and 2009, and by President 
Barack Obama’s decision to continue their use under his administration, notwithstanding 
his criticisms of them as a candidate. There is, no doubt, historical precedent for military 
commissions – but for the most part, that historical precedent involved materially 
different situations, in which military commissions were a matter of necessity, not 
discretion.  Military commissions were employed, for example, where the military had 
ousted the existing government, and had to provide some venue for the enforcement of 
law as an occupying force. Moreover, their procedures have generally conformed to those 
of courts-martial. In the current circumstances, by contrast, there seems to be little or no 
necessity for military commissions.  Most of the conduct charged and tried as war crimes 
in military commissions could be charged and tried in civilian criminal courts, under 
ordinary terrorism laws.  And if it is thought that a military court is particularly 
appropriate for the trial of war crimes, the preexisting and established system of courts-
martial could have been employed.  
 
Both the civilian criminal court and the court-martial are preferable venues for 
many reasons. They both have established track records. The United States has a robust 
civilian criminal justice system, in which many individuals have been tried successfully 
for terrorist crimes, both before and after September 11, 2001. And the United States has 
an equally strong court-martial system, with rules of evidence that largely track those of 
civilian criminal courts, and in which thousands of criminal trials have been successfully 
conducted. The rules governing civilian criminal proceedings and courts-martial are 
clear, well-settled, and have been subjected to and survived repeated constitutional 
testing. The judges are experienced in conducting trials. There is substantial precedent to 
guide their decisions, which decreases the likelihood of erroneous or arbitrary decision 
making, and in turn reduces the likelihood of long and costly appeals and retrials.   
 
Perhaps most significantly, civilian criminal trials and courts-martial enjoy the 
imprimatur of legitimacy. American criminal procedure has its flaws, to be sure, but apart 
from its reliance on the death penalty, its criminal trial practices are not generally subject 
to criticism for the denial of basic human rights.1 Both the civilian justice system and the 
court-martial proceedings afford defendants the right to notice of the charges, the right to 
confront and rebut the evidence against them, the assistance of counsel, the right to a trial 
by a jury of one’s peers, the privilege against compelled self-incrimination, the right to 
independent appellate review, and a panoply of other rights. Moreover, at least as a 
formal matter, the rules apply equally to all defendants. A foreign national being tried for 
a criminal offense in a civilian court or a court-martial has all the same trial rights that a 
US citizen does. As a result, when an individual is convicted in either a civilian criminal 
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court or a court-martial, there is a presumption that his conviction was warranted. 
Injustices occur, of course; but the burden is on the individual convicted to demonstrate 
that in his case injustice was done.   
 
Military commissions, by contrast, are largely untested; the few military 
commission proceedings that have been conducted at Guantánamo thus far have been rife 
with errors, misfires, and embarrassments. Military commissions are discriminatory on 
their face, as they apply only to foreign nationals, not U.S. citizens accused of the very 
same conduct. And in large part because the Bush administration’s initial version of 
military commissions was patently invalid, their procedures are widely perceived as 
illegitimate. The military commissions have already gone through at least three separate 
iterations, and every attempt to proceed has been beset by countless problems. The initial 
post-9/11 commissions were created by a summary presidential order, supplemented by 
barely more detailed military orders. They allowed the introduction of testimony obtained 
through torture, permitted defendants to be tried effectively in absentia, and contemplated 
no judicial review. The president supervised the prosecution, the judges, the defense, and 
was the final stage of appeal. When the Supreme Court ruled in 2006 that the original 
commissions violated the laws of war and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, in 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,2 Congress responded with the 2006 Military Commissions Act 
(“2006 Act”). That act did relatively little to correct the procedural deficiencies in the 
military commissions, still permitted the introduction of coerced testimony, and treated 
conduct as “war crimes” that had never before been so recognized, including “material 
support” to terrorism and “conspiracy.”   
 
The few attempts to pursue military charges in military commissions under the 
2006 Act were beleaguered by legal problems. Several military lawyers involved in the 
process resigned because of ethical concerns regarding interference with the process, the 
use of tortured evidence, and attempts to conceal exculpatory evidence from defense 
counsel. Practically the only convictions obtained were through guilty pleas that 
effectively granted defendants a short fixed term and release from Guantánamo, a better 
deal than the indefinite detention they otherwise faced as “enemy combatants.”3 None of 
those tried were central figures; more often than not, they were drivers or foot soldiers.  
When President Obama took office, Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act of 
2009 (“2009 Act”), which improved the procedures substantially – but still fell short of 
providing the guarantees available in military courts-martial, continued to apply 
exclusively to foreign nationals, and still authorized charges for conduct that the rest of 
the world had never viewed as a war crime. As of this writing, the Obama administration 
has re-started military commission proceedings against Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the 
alleged mastermind of the 9/11 attacks.  After an aborted military commission proceeding 
brought against KSM by the Bush administration, the Justice Department under Obama 
initially decided to try Mohammed in a civilian criminal court in New York City.  When 
political opposition mounted and Congress tied its hands by barring the expenditure of 
funds to bring Guantánamo detainees to the United States, even for a criminal trial, the 
Obama administration indicted KSM again before a military commission. Those 
proceedings have only begun, but if recent history is any indication, the new proceedings 
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will again be tied up in knotty problems, for which there will be little if any precedent to 
guide the military judges who preside.     
 
Why invite such trouble? If Guantánamo detainees have committed terrorist 
offenses, they can be tried in civilian criminal courts. If the president believes that some 
should be prosecuted for war crimes in a military venue, courts-martial could be 
employed for that task. In his May 2009 speech on national security at the National 
Archives, President Obama expressed a strong preference for civilian criminal trials, 
stating that “wherever feasible,” those held at Guantánamo would be tried in civilian 
criminal court.4 But he retained the option of trials in military commissions, explaining:   
 
Military commissions have a history in the United States dating back to 
George Washington and the Revolutionary War. They are an appropriate 
venue for trying detainees for violations of the laws of war. They allow for 
the protection of sensitive sources and methods of intelligence-gathering; 
they allow for the safety and security of participants; and for the 
presentation of evidence gathered from the battlefield that cannot always 
be effectively presented in federal courts.5 
 
 Do these justifications warrant the use of military commissions? In this essay, I 
maintain that they do not. In the end, the impetus behind the military commissions is the 
hope – in my view, unsupported – that the commissions may permit easier convictions of 
individuals, and may allow prosecutors to avoid confronting the consequences of the 
United States’ systemic reliance on torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading tactics in 
its interrogations of detainees. In this respect, the commissions are best understood not as 
a legitimate forum for trying war crimes, but as an avenue for short-circuiting legal 
processes that might hold us accountable for our wrongs.   
 
The military commissions are a by-product of the “paradigm of prevention,” a 
term coined by then-Attorney General John Ashcroft for the post-9/11 emphasis on 
aggressively preventing future terrorism, rather than responding to crime after the fact.  
That approach stressed early intervention and aggressive gathering of intelligence about 
future threats, and therefore led government officials to sweep broadly, presume guilt 
without substantial evidence, detain innocents, and adopt “enhanced interrogation 
techniques” to coerce detainees into talking. Those choices, in turn, have greatly 
complicated and compromised the task of holding terrorists accountable, because such 
illegal shortcuts on investigatory rules taint any evidence obtained therefrom, and make it 
inadmissible in a criminal trial.   
 
The military commissions reflect an ill-advised effort to avoid paying the price for 
the “paradigm of prevention.” That goal is an illegitimate one, and will in the end leave 
the commissions – and any convictions obtained in them – fundamentally tainted. Absent 
a willingness both to reckon candidly with the United States’ own past wrongs, and to 
proceed in the future under fundamentally fair trial procedures, the military commissions 
are likely to disserve our security interests and undermine our constitutional principles.   
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II.   THE ASSERTED JUSTIFICATIONS FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS 
 
 President Obama offered four justifications for the use of military commissions: 
(1) they are an appropriate forum for trying war crimes; (2) they “allow for the protection 
of sensitive sources and methods of intelligence-gathering;” (3) they are more secure; and 
(4) their evidentiary rules are more tolerant, recognizing that evidence gathered from the 
battlefield cannot be expected to meet the requirements we impose in civilian criminal 
courts. These rationales are not frivolous, and may well justify military commissions in 
certain circumstances. But they do not suffice to justify the military commissions in the 
form they take under the 2009 Act and as they have been and are being employed by the 
military at Guantánamo. 
 
 Military commissions have been used to try individuals for war crimes, but they 
are generally restricted to situations of necessity, where other courts are unavailable.  
Thus, for example, the United States first employed military commissions during the 
Mexican War, in order to maintain order in occupied territory, where neither U.S. civilian 
courts nor courts-martial had jurisdiction.6 They were used during the Civil War with 
mixed results, sometimes properly employed to try war crimes subject to procedures 
equivalent to those provided in courts-martial, but other times used, it appeared, to ensure 
convictions.7 When President Lincoln sought to use a military commission to try a 
civilian accused of supporting the rebel forces, the Supreme Court held that he had 
overstepped his authority, and that civilians could not be tried in a military commission 
where the civilian courts were open and ready for business.8 Military commissions were 
used during the Philippines Insurrection of 1899–1902, but their procedures conformed to 
those in courts-martial, and they used the same rules of evidence used in civilian courts.9 
Thus, military commissions are most legitimate when used as a matter of necessity, and 
without departing significantly from the procedural practices in other courts. 
 
There are exceptions to this pattern, to be sure. The most prominent – and the 
most dubious – is the military commission that President Franklin D. Roosevelt created to 
try Nazi saboteurs who landed in the United States in a German U-boat, crossed the 
border wearing civilian clothes, and were planning to blow up munitions factories.  The 
saboteurs could have been tried in civilian courts for their crimes, and civilian courts 
were certainly open for business. Roosevelt had them tried in a military commission, 
empowered to create its own rules, with an appeal only to him, because he feared that a 
civilian criminal trial would not lead to a sufficient penalty. But there is also evidence 
that the government did not want it known that the men were discovered only because 
one of the saboteurs chose to turn on his partner and revealed the conspiracy to the FBI.10 
The trials were held behind closed doors in the Justice Department, and most of the 
saboteurs were sentenced to death. The Supreme Court took up an extraordinary habeas 
review of the tribunal while it was underway, affirmed the tribunal’s jurisdiction in a 
summary order one week later, and did not write its decision justifying its result until 
after the defendants had been executed.   
 
It is far from clear that military commissions are a matter of necessity for trials of 
most of those held at Guantánamo. In the case of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, for 
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example, the United States was fully prepared to try him and his coconspirators in a 
civilian criminal court in Manhattan; in fact, the Justice Department determined that a 
civilian criminal trial was the more appropriate forum. But if they can be tried in a 
civilian criminal court, it is not even clear that we should be able to resort to military 
commissions, because in that context, the commissions are evidently not a matter of 
necessity. Most war crimes are also a federal crime prosecutable in civilian criminal 
court.11 The most frequent charge thus far in the military commissions has been the 
provision of “material support” to terrorism. But federal criminal law also prohibits 
material support to terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda, as well as material support to 
terrorist acts.12 In some instances, these domestic laws may not have had a sufficient 
extraterritorial reach at the time Guantánamo detainees engaged in the conduct for which 
they might be charged. If their conduct was nonetheless a war crime, then a military 
forum might be the only venue in which they could be tried; but in that case, military 
courts-martial would be available. In many instances, in any event, individuals could be 
tried in civilian criminal court for violating federal laws. And if a detainee’s conduct 
could be prosecuted in civilian criminal court, or even in a court-martial, the 
administration must point to some rationale other than the “appropriateness of military 
commissions for war crimes” to justify proceeding in a military commission.   
 
The second rationale President Obama advanced – the need to protect sensitive 
sources and methods of intelligence-gathering –  also provides little support for using 
military commissions. Federal civilian courts are well acquainted with classified 
information and maintaining secrecy where warranted.  Under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, federal judges hear classified requests for orders authorizing 
wiretapping and searches for foreign intelligence and counterterrorism purposes.13 Under 
the Classified Information Procedures Act (“CIPA”), federal courts handle and assess 
classified information related to criminal trials.14 In the habeas corpus proceedings 
reviewing Guantánamo detentions that federal courts in the District of Columbia have 
been conducting, the federal courts routinely consider classified information, and 
attorneys for both sides have access to the information and may rely on it in their briefs, 
so long as they are filed under seal. Thus far, there have been no reports of mishaps or 
leaks. By contrast, virtually all of the military’s secret intelligence assessments of 
Guantánamo detainees were disclosed to WikiLeaks, allegedly by a military intelligence 
operative, and then released by WikiLeaks and several news outlets to the general public. 
Thus, it is far from clear that the military process has any distinct advantage over civilian 
courts when it comes to keeping secrets.   
 
 If President Obama meant that trials in military commissions might permit 
individuals to be tried and convicted on evidence without disclosing its source, it is not 
clear that the military commission rules make that possible. The treatment of classified 
evidence in military commissions under the 2009 Act is closely modeled on the CIPA 
rules that govern civilian criminal trials, and those rules appear to provide no advantage 
to using military commissions. Moreover, any such shortcut would very likely deprive 
the defendant of the fundamental elements of a fair trial. If due process applies to the 
Guantánamo military commissions – and it is likely to, given the extension of habeas 
corpus there – the prosecution will not be able to conceal sources and methods of 
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evidence gathering wherever access to those sources and methods is necessary to 
confront the evidence used against the defendant. As a matter of due process and 
fundamental fairness, defendants would presumably be entitled to know, for example, 
whether any evidence used against them was obtained from coerced testimony, or from a 
lead generated through coerced testimony. They would also presumably be entitled to 
know the identity of their accusers, because without that information one cannot 
meaningfully challenge the reliability of what has been said. Any trial in which such 
information was denied to the defense would very likely be viewed as illegitimate – and 
properly so. Thus, it is simply not evident that military commissions, if they are to be fair, 
will be able to protect sensitive sources and methods any more robustly than civilian 
criminal trials. 
 
 The third rationale President Obama offered for military commissions is that the 
proceedings can be made more secure for the participants, presumably because they can 
be held on a military base, far from a civilian population, and subject to the security 
measures the military can provide. It is certainly plausible that it would be easier to hold 
a secure trial at Guantánamo than in the heart of Manhattan, but the difference is really a 
geographic one and has nothing to do with the difference between a military and a 
civilian trial. A civilian trial at Guantánamo would be easier to make secure than a 
military trial in Manhattan. Congress could presumably authorize a federal civilian court 
to conduct trials at Guantánamo, just as a federal civilian court conducted certain legal 
proceedings in Berlin after the war.15   
 
 Fourth, President Obama reasoned that military commissions might admit and 
consider evidence gathered from the battlefield that could not satisfy the rigorous 
requirements that apply to evidence in a civilian criminal court. There may well be some 
situations in which this will prove a salient difference. But courts-martial have for years 
dealt with situations that arise on or near battlefields, and they apply largely the same 
evidentiary rules as civilian criminal trials. Moreover, many of the detainees at 
Guantánamo were not picked up on a battlefield at all, but were captured far from any 
battlefield, or were turned over by bounty hunters. For the vast number of detainees not 
captured on the field of battle, Obama’s fourth rationale would be inapplicable, and the 
administration has offered no reason why the government should be permitted to avoid 
ordinary evidentiary requirements in such cases. Those requirements, after all, are 
designed only to ensure the accuracy and reliability of evidence; they were not created 
simply to impose meaningless obligations on government.  Short-circuiting them comes 
at a cost to reliability – a cost that may arguably be warranted in some battlefield 
situations, but not otherwise.   
 
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the fact that military commissions are 
applicable only to foreign nationals accused of war crimes, and not to U.S. citizens 
accused of the same crimes, undermines all of the above arguments. If a military 
commission is appropriate to try foreign nationals for war crimes, why would it not be 
equally appropriate to try U.S. nationals? Concerns about sources and methods, the 
security of the proceedings, and the difficulties of evidence gathering on the battlefield 
are exactly the same whether the defendant is a U.S. citizen or a foreign national. Yet we 
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have committed to trying U.S. citizens accused of war crimes in civilian criminal courts.  
John Walker Lindh, the so-called American Taliban, captured on the battlefield in 
Afghanistan, was tried in a civilian criminal court for “material support,” not in a military 
commission. If the civilian criminal court system is sufficient for trying U.S. citizens, it is 
sufficient for trying foreign nationals as well.16   
 
 
  
III. MILITARY COMMISSIONS AS AN OUTGROWTH OF THE PREVENTIVE 
PARADIGM 
 
 The poverty of the asserted justifications for military commissions suggests that 
what is really at stake is some other, unstated interest. Some advocates of using military 
commissions appear to be driven by an ideological commitment to military commissions 
as a fundamental feature of the “war paradigm.” The view that the struggle with Al 
Qaeda is properly understood as a war, and that therefore civilian criminal law measures 
are inappropriate, no doubt motivates some of the commentators who insist on the use of 
military tribunals. But that is not President Obama’s view, and does not reflect accurately 
President Bush’s practice. Both Presidents Bush’s and Obama’s administrations have 
prosecuted Al Qaeda-related would-be terrorists in civilian criminal court; neither took 
the position that civilian criminal measures were inappropriate ab initio for terrorism 
cases, or for Al Qaeda terrorism cases.17 
 
 What seems a more likely motive for the persistence of military commissions is 
the hope that by employing such commissions, the United States might avoid paying the 
costs of its imprudent resort to illegal tactics in pursuing the “paradigm of prevention.”  
In a meeting on September 12, 2001, at the White House, recounted by Bob Woodward 
in Bush at War, FBI Director Robert Mueller was briefing the National Security Council 
on the events of the day before, and stressing the need to investigate in a manner that did 
not taint the evidence. At that point, Woodward reports, Ashcroft interrupted: “Let’s stop 
the discussion right here. The chief mission of U.S. law enforcement, he added, is to stop 
another attack and apprehend any accomplices or terrorists before they hit us again. If we 
can’t bring them to trial, so be it.”18   
 
In the days that followed, the Bush administration followed Ashcroft’s advice, not 
Mueller’s. But while it readily adopted Ashcroft’s prescription for prevention, it was less 
willing to accept his “so be it” with regard to prosecution. The military commissions can 
be understood as an attempt to act preventively and “bring them to trial,” to avoid the 
trade-off that Ashcroft suggested was necessary and warranted. 
 
The Bush administration embraced wholeheartedly the “paradigm of prevention.”  
In the first days, months, and years after 9/11, it used a variety of mechanisms to detain 
individuals before they committed an act of terrorism. By definition, this meant sweeping 
broadly, because the government could not, of course, predict who would actually 
commit a terrorist act if left free. In the United States, Ashcroft oversaw an aggressive 
deployment of immigration law, the “material witness” statute, and pretextual 
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prosecutions in the first two years after 9/11 that led to the detention of more than five 
thousand foreign nationals suspected, often on the slimmest of reeds, of possibly being 
involved in terrorism.19 Nearly all were Arab or Muslim men. Of the five thousand 
detained, none were actually charged and convicted of any act of terrorism. Most were 
held on immigration charges, often exceedingly technical. And many were held without 
any evidence that they actually posed any danger to the community, much less of 
terrorism.   
 
Beyond our borders, the Bush administration followed a similar policy of 
sweeping detention. It brought 779 “terror suspects” to Guantánamo. The administration 
insisted initially that these detainees were the “worst of the worst,” and claimed that they 
had been carefully screened. Yet by the time the Bush administration had left office it had 
released more than five hundred of them. It had little or no reliable evidence that many of 
these individuals were in fact dangerous, and when the Supreme Court ruled that the 
detainees were entitled to review the legality of their detentions in court, the Bush 
administration started releasing many of those it had once claimed were “the worst of the 
worst.” The majority were not captured by U.S. forces, but were turned in by others, 
often to obtain bounties that were equivalent to a year’s salary in Afghanistan. Secret 
military intelligence assessments of the risk posed by each detainee, disclosed by 
WikiLeaks in 2011, revealed that the military classified many as “high risk,” but released 
them anyway, and that the assessments were often based on unreliable statements 
obtained through coercion, without any acknowledgment by the military that the 
statements might be unreliable.20   
 
The administration’s broad-brush preventive approach in turn placed tremendous 
pressure on using interrogation as an intelligence-gathering mechanism. Law 
enforcement and intelligence agents generally prefer not to detain suspects prematurely, 
because once one does so, the suspect and his accomplices know that the government is 
aware of their activities. Where one can instead maintain surveillance without imminent 
danger, it is far better, both from an intelligence perspective and from the standpoint of 
gathering admissible evidence to prosecute, as such surveillance is often more likely to 
provide a better understanding of the scope of the conspiracy or illegal scheme. If, in the 
name of prevention, suspects are detained prematurely and on scant information, then the 
only way to gather intelligence is by interrogation.   
 
At the same time, if one sweeps broadly, many of those detained are likely to be 
innocent, and may well lack any information regarding true threats. If so, interrogation 
will often prove frustrating, as interrogators confront “suspects” who actually have 
nothing to tell them. Moreover, an ideologically driven opponent is likely to be less 
willing to share information than an ordinary criminal defendant, so it will be difficult to 
distinguish those genuine suspects who have information and are not sharing it from 
mistaken suspects who simply have nothing to share. 
 
These circumstances quickly led the Bush administration to entertain the 
possibility of employing harsh interrogation tactics. In August 2002, the Justice 
Department, with the approval of President Bush and Vice President Cheney, authorized 
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the CIA to use “enhanced interrogation tactics,” including slamming suspects into walls, 
sleep deprivation of up to eleven days straight, painful stress positions, confinement in 
small boxes, and waterboarding, in order to obtain information from “high-value 
detainees” who had been “disappeared” into CIA secret prisons. A few months later, 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld authorized interrogators at Guantánamo to use 
similar, though somewhat less extreme, tactics. These tactics were used for over 100 days 
straight on one Guantánamo detainee, Mohammed al Qahtani, to such an extent that the 
military’s own prosecutor, Susan Crawford, determined that she had to dismiss a war 
crimes case against him because al Qahtani had been tortured. After the officer in charge 
at Guantánamo visited Abu Ghraib, similar tactics “migrated” there. The administration 
also adopted a policy of “extraordinary rendition,” in which suspects were kidnapped and 
delivered to security officials in countries like Syria, Egypt, and Jordan, to be 
interrogated using the very torture tactics that the United States State Department has 
long condemned in those countries.   
 
The Bush administration justified all of these tactics in the name of preventing the 
next attack. There is no evidence that the tactics actually preempted any actual attacks.  
As noted above, none of the five thousand foreign nationals preventively detained in the 
United States was convicted of a terrorist offense. The CIA’s own Inspector General, in a 
study of the “enhanced interrogation tactics,” concluded that it identified no evidence that 
the coercive tactics obtained information that lawful interrogation could not have 
obtained, and indeed that in many instances it could not disentangle information obtained 
from legal and coercive tactics. President Bush and Vice President Cheney claimed 
repeatedly that the tactics had “saved lives,” but never identified a single instance in 
which that claim could be verified. After a naval special operations team killed Osama 
bin Laden in May 2011, some of those who authorized torture argued that their tactics 
had led to the discovery of bin Laden’s hiding place by helping to identify the courier that 
eventually led investigators to bin Laden, but the facts do not support their self-interested 
claim. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Faraj al-Libi were subjected to enhanced 
interrogation tactics, but neither is reported to have identified the courier. In fact, both 
provided affirmatively misleading information regarding the courier after they were 
subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques.  And neither provided any information at 
all about the courier in direct response to the enhanced interrogation techniques, but only 
long afterward, in response to ordinary questioning.21   
 
Whether or not such tactics – illegal detentions, renditions, torture, and cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment – resulted in useful information is at best debatable. It 
is indisputable, however, that because they are illegal, they taint any evidence obtained 
from their deployment. As a result, such information would plainly be inadmissible in a 
civilian criminal court – or a court-martial, where similar rules of exclusion apply.  
Moreover, even if the government attempts to make its case without relying affirmatively 
on any tainted evidence, defendants who have been subjected to such tactics are almost 
certain to seek to use it in their defense. It might support a claim that as a result of their 
mistreatment, they are no longer mentally competent to stand trial. The use of such tactics 
on a systemic basis calls into question virtually any evidence the government gathers 
subsequently, as much of it may be linked back, through some chain of leads or 
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“mosaic,” to the use of torture or coercive interrogation. Defense lawyers would be 
ineffective if they did not aggressively pursue discovery of potentially exculpatory 
evidence regarding these practices and their potential impact on any evidence the 
government sought to introduce.   
 
As anyone with foresight would have predicted, the administration could not 
really accept the consequences of Ashcroft’s “so be it” statement of bravado. There are 
substantial moral, political, and legal pressures to bring to justice those who have 
perpetrated acts of terrorism. The United States cannot responsibly leave unprosecuted 
those who attacked it on September 11 and killed three thousand innocent civilians. But 
how, for example, does the United States try Khalid Sheikh Mohammed after he has been 
disappeared into a secret prison for years, and waterboarded 183 times?   
 
Military commissions were the Bush administration’s answer. As initially 
formulated by the executive branch, the commissions would permit defendants to be tried 
on the basis of coerced testimony.When the Supreme Court declared President Bush’s 
military commissions to be in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, Congress enacted the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006. This act prohibited admission of tortured statements, but 
permitted statements coerced through mistreatment short of torture so long as a military 
judge deemed it “reliable.”23   
 
In 2009, Congress again amended the rules governing military commissions, and 
tightened the rules for admissibility of an accused’s statements. The 2009 Act prohibits 
categorically the introduction of any statement obtained through torture or cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment.24 It generally requires that an accused’s prior 
statements can be introduced only if deemed voluntary – which is what the Supreme 
Court has long ruled that due process requires in civilian criminal trials.25 But it still 
makes an exception, permitting even involuntary statements if the military judge finds 
that “the statement was made incident to lawful conduct during military operations at the 
point of capture or during closely related active combat engagement, and the interests of 
justice would best be served by admission of the statement.”26 This exception appears to 
be narrow, and presumably would not apply to statements obtained at CIA “black sites” 
or at Guantánamo, as these would not meet the requirement that they be “at the point of 
capture or during closely related active combat engagement.” Thus, while the 
commission rules were initially designed to permit the introduction of coerced testimony, 
thereby allowing the government to avoid paying the cost of its illegal interrogation 
tactics, under the current rules that particular loophole has largely been closed.  
 
The military commissions, however, continue to seek to further the government’s 
“preventive paradigm” in still another way – they permit prosecution for conduct that was 
in fact not a crime when it took place, and that is not a war crime at all. The 2009 Act, 
like the 2006 Act, makes it a crime, for example, to provide “material support or 
resources to an international terrorist organization engaged in hostilities against the 
United States.”27 The international laws of war, however, have never recognized 
“material support” as a war crime. The statute also permits prosecution for “conspiracy” 
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to engage in any other war crime, including “material support.” In Hamdan, the Court’s 
four-Justice plurality concluded that “conspiracy” was not a war crime under the laws of 
war.28 Justice Kennedy, the fifth vote, deemed it unnecessary to reach the issue. If these 
“crimes” are not recognized internationally by the laws of war, two issues arise: (1) may 
Congress, pursuant to its authority to define offenses against the law of nations, enact 
“war crimes” that in fact have no foundation in the laws of war; and (2) even if Congress 
has the power to expand the scope of “war crimes,” if these acts were not recognized as 
war crimes by the laws of war, application of the 2009 Act to acts committed prior to its 
enactment constitutes ex post facto punishment.    
 
The administration’s interpretation and enforcement of other “war crimes” has 
also raised serious legal questions about its misuse of the law of war. David Glazier 
argues convincingly, for example, that the United States has effectively sought to make 
fighting for the other side a war crime, without more.29 Thus, in its prosecution of Omar 
Khadr, a young Canadian captured on the battlefield after shooting an American soldier, 
the government argued that Khadr had committed murder and attempted murder in 
violation of the laws of war by merely engaging in battle against the United States 
military on behalf of Al Qaeda. The United States’ theory appears to be that since Al 
Qaeda does not have the privilege of belligerency, any fighting anyone engages in on its 
behalf, even when targeted at combatants, is a war crime. On this view, it is a war crime 
for Al Qaeda to fight, and the law of war would become a sword under which the United 
States can shoot to kill their combatants, but they can’t shoot back at U.S. combatants. 
The government’s approach, Glazier argues, “repudiates the functional equivalence 
between the conflict parties which is a core element of the [law of armed conflict], and 
endeavors to transform it into a unilateral shield for one side.”30 
 
As Glazier explains, the law of war does not make killing combatants a war 
crime, unless it is done in particularly egregious ways.31 An unprivileged belligerent may 
be tried for murder if he kills a combatant, or attempted murder for trying to do so, but 
only as a domestic law matter, in a civilian court – not as a war crime in a military 
commission. Glazier quotes law of war expert Yoram Dinstein, who writes in his treatise 
on the law of armed conflict:  “With unlawful combatants, [the law of armed 
conflict]refrains from stigmatizing the acts as criminal. It merely takes off a mantle of 
immunity from the defendant, who is therefore accessible to penal charges for any 
offense committed against the domestic legal system.”32 The International Committee of 
the Red Cross takes the same view.33 
 
The United States’ attempt to stretch the concept of “war crimes” in these ways is 
particularly telling in light of the fact that Al Qaeda fighters’ status as unprivileged 
belligerents means that they have no “privilege of belligerency” and are therefore subject 
to ordinary domestic prosecution. It suggests a strong incentive to try detainees in 
military commissions. And that incentive, it seems, cannot be explained by any of the 
rationales President Obama has set forth. Even if military commissions were especially 
appropriate for the trial of war crimes, as opposed to courts-martial, the fact that many of 
the crimes defined by Congress and charged by the executive are not in fact legitimate 
war crimes directly undermines that rationale. It appears that the real motive for 
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employing military commissions is a sense that convictions will be easier to obtain – and 
that is hardly a legitimate justification for affording second-class justice. That motive, in 
turn, may be driven by the preventive rationale; one way to make the law more 
effectively “preventive” is to reduce or eliminate safeguards for criminal defendants 
while expanding the scope of conduct subject to criminal prosecution. The military 
commissions do just that.   
 
IV.   CONCLUSION: TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND FAIR 
PROCESS 
 
Even the physical design of the Guantánamo courtroom where military 
commission trials are conducted is shaped by the desire to conceal the government’s own 
abuses. A soundproof glass wall separates the onlookers from the trial participants, so 
that the only way an observer can hear what is going on is through headphones with a 
forty second delay. The reason, according to Denny LeBoeuf, an ACLU lawyer advising 
on the defense of several detainees, is “the Rule: detainees are forbidden from speaking 
about their torture.” Even in pretrial proceedings, the wall has been employed to block 
public transmission of information the military wants to keep secret – and the central 
secrets they seek to preserve are the details of the defendant’s mistreatment and torture at 
U.S. hands.  Remarkably, the US government has declared “classified” anything that the 
detainees say about their torture, and has required the lawyers, as a condition of access to 
their clients, to keep secret all details of their clients’ treatment. But of course, the US 
cannot compel the detainees themselves not to speak of the unspeakable. The only way it 
can keep them from telling their stories is by keeping them detained, behind bars, behind 
glass, silenced. 
 
That soundproof wall is an apt symbol for the United States’ choice to use 
military commissions at all. It was and remains driven not by necessity, as war crimes 
may be tried in courts-martial, and most acts of terrorism that target or affect the United 
States or its citizens are crimes prosecutable in civilian criminal court. Rather, the choice 
to employ military commissions is driven by a sense that in some cases, we want to hold 
individuals responsible even where we lack admissible evidence establishing their guilt.  
The military commissions originally permitted reliance on statements obtained by torture. 
Today, tortured testimony is excluded, but the commission procedures still fall short of 
those provided in courts-martial. If they didn’t, there would be no need for them, as they 
would be entirely duplicative. But the government has yet to offer any legitimate 
rationale for seeking an easier avenue to convictions. None of the justifications President 
Obama advanced withstand scrutiny. One is left feeling that the commissions are, in the 
end, nothing more than a way to get around the deal John Ashcroft advocated, and the 
Bush administration accepted, on September 12, 2001: “if we can’t bring them to trial , so 
be it.” That deal no longer looks so good, and the military commissions are an attempt to 
bring them to trial notwithstanding our own violations of law. 
 
That strategy, however, is not sustainable. Any convictions obtained through 
military commissions are exceedingly likely to be viewed as illegitimate by much of the 
world. As such, they are likely to play into Al Qaeda’s hands, much as our interrogation 
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tactics at Abu Ghraib, the CIA black sites, and Guantánamo itself offered Al Qaeda the 
best propaganda it could find. Military commission convictions will support the 
terrorists’ narrative, in which they are martyrs for a cause, fighting injustice – not brutal 
criminals who targeted innocent and defenseless civilians.   
 
The fact that the United States employed a paradigm of prevention, and in some 
instances violated basic principles of international and domestic law in doing so, does not 
mean that terrorists must go free. The fact that a suspect has been tortured does not 
excuse his crimes, nor does it bar any prosecution. Torture taints subsequent evidence, 
but if the government can meet its burden of demonstrating that all of its evidence has an 
independent source, it may proceed with its trial. Much like the prosecution of a tortured 
defendant, the United States’ efforts at bringing terrorists at Guantánamo to justice 
through the military system are tainted, not only by torture and mistreatment of 
defendants, but more broadly by the history of the military commissions themselves. This  
does not mean that alleged terrorists cannot be brought to justice. But it does mean that 
the United States bears a heavy burden of proving to the world that it has not profited 
from its illegal actions, and that it has cleared up the taint of the past. That burden is 
unlikely to be met in a military commission process that provides second-class justice 
only to foreign nationals. The best way forward would be to abandon the military 
commissions, and to commit to a principle of equality, in which foreign nationals accused 
of terrorism have the same rights as U.S. citizens accused of terrorism, whether in a 
civilian criminal court or a military court-martial.   
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